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Historically, appearance of the quantum theory led to a prevailing view that Nature is indeter-
ministic. The arguments for the indeterminism and proposals for indeterministic and deterministic
approaches are reviewed. These include collapse theories, Bohmian Mechanics and the many-worlds
interpretation. It is argued that ontic interpretations of the quantum wave function provide simpler
and clearer physical explanation and that the many-worlds interpretation is the most attractive
since it provides a deterministic and local theory for our physical Universe explaining the illusion of
randomness and nonlocality in the world we experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum theory and determinism usually do not go
together. A natural combination is quantum theory and
randomness. Indeed, when in the end of 19th century
physics seemed to be close to provide a very good de-
terministic explanation of all observed phenomena, Lord
Kelvin identified “two clouds” on “the beauty and clear-
ness of the dynamical theory”. One of this “clouds”
was the quantum theory which brought a consensus that
there is randomness in physics. Recently we even “cer-
tify” randomness using quantum experiments [1].
I do not think that there is anything wrong with these
experiments. They create numbers which we can safely
consider “random” for various cryptographic tasks. But I
feel that we should not give up the idea that the Universe
is governed by a deterministic law. Quantum theory is
correct, but determinism is correct too. I will argue that
the quantum theory of the wave function of the Universe
is a very successful deterministic theory fully consistent
with our experimental evidence. However, it requires ac-
cepting that the world we experience is only part of the
reality and there are numerous parallel worlds. The ex-
istence of parallel worlds allows us to have a clear deter-
ministic and local physical theory.
Before presenting this view I review how quantum the-
ory led to believe that Nature is random. I give a critical
review of attempts to construct theories with randomness
underlying quantum theory. I discuss modifications of
the standard formalism suggesting physical mechanisms
for collapse. Then I turn to options for deterministic the-
ories by discussing Bohmian mechanics and its variations,
in particular a many Bohmian worlds proposal. Finally, I
present the many-worlds interpretation and explain how
one can deal with its most serious difficulty, the issue of
probability.
II. DETERMINISM
In my entry on the Many-Worlds Interpretation
(MWI) [2] I wrote that we should prefer the MWI relative
to some other interpretations because it removes random-
ness from quantum mechanics and thus allows physics to
be a deterministic theory. Last year I made a revision of
the entry which was refereed. One of the comments of the
referee was: “Why I consider the fact that MWI is a de-
terministic theory a reason for believing it?” I thought
it is obvious: a theory which cannot predict what will
happen next given all information that exist now, clearly
is not as good as a theory which can.
It seems that in the end of the 19th century a ref-
eree would not ask such a question. The dominant view
then was that physics, consisted of Newton’s mechanics
and Maxwell’s electrodynamics, is a deterministic theory
which is very close to provide a complete explanation of
Nature. Most scientists accepted a gedanken possibility
of existence of “Laplacean Demon” [3]:
We may regard the present state of the Uni-
verse as the effect of its past and the cause of
its future. An intellect which at a certain mo-
ment would know all forces that set nature in
motion, and all positions of all items of which
nature is composed, if this intellect were also
vast enough to submit these data to analy-
sis, it would embrace in a single formula the
movements of the greatest bodies of the Uni-
verse and those of the tiniest atom; for such
an intellect nothing would be uncertain and
the future just like the past would be present
before its eyes.
(Laplace, 1814)
The idea of determinism has ancient roots [4]:
Nothing occurs at random, but everything for
a reason and by necessity.
(Leucippus, 440 BCE)
Obvious tensions with the idea of a free will of a man
or of a God led many philosophers to analyze this ques-
tion. Probably the most clear and radical position was
expressed by Spinoza [5]:
In nature there is nothing contingent, but all
things have been determined from the neces-
sity of the divine nature to exist and produce
an effect in a certain way.
(Spinoza, 1677)
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the Principle of Sufficient Reason [6]:
Everything proceeds mathematically ... if
someone could have a sufficient insight into
the inner parts of things, and in addition had
remembrance and intelligence enough to con-
sider all the circumstances and take them into
account, he would be a prophet and see the
future in the present as in a mirror.
(Leibniz, 1680)
Hundred years ago Russell mentioned similar views, but
already had some doubts [7]:
The law of causation, according to which
later events can theoretically be predicted by
means of earlier events, has often been held
to be a priori, a necessity of thought, a cate-
gory without which science would not be pos-
sible. These claims seem to me excessive. In
certain directions the law has been verified
empirically, and in other directions there is
no positive evidence against it. But science
can use it where it has been found to be true,
without being forced into any assumption as
to its truth in other fields. We cannot, there-
fore, feel any a priori certainty that causation
must apply to human volitions.
(Russel, 1914)
It was quantum theory which completely changed the
general attitude. But the founders of quantum me-
chanics did not give up the idea of determinism easily.
Schro¨dinger, Plank, and notably Einstein with his famous
dictum: “God does not play dice”, were standing against
indeterminism. Earman, a contemporary philosopher
who spent probably more effort on the issue of deter-
minism than anyone else, writes [8]:
... while there is no a priori guarantee that
the laws of the ideal theory of physics will
be deterministic, the history of physics shows
that determinism is taken to be what might
be termed a ‘defeasible methodological im-
perative’: start by assuming that determin-
ism is true; if the candidate laws discovered so
far are not deterministic, then presume that
there are other laws to be discovered, or that
the ones so far discovered are only approx-
imations to the correct laws; only after long
and repeated failure may we entertain the hy-
pothesis that the failure to find deterministic
laws does not represent a lack of imagination
or diligence on our part but reflects the fact
that Nature is non-deterministic. An expres-
sion of this sentiment can be found in the
work of Max Planck, one of the founders of
quantum physics: determinism (a.k.a. the
law of causality), he wrote, is a “heuristic
principle, a signpost and in my opinion the
most valuable signpost we possess, to guide
us through the motley disorder of events and
to indicate the direction in which scientific in-
quiry should proceed in order to attain fruit-
ful results [Plank, 1932]”
(Earman, 1986)
I do not see a “failure to find deterministic laws of
physics”. All physical laws I studied, except for the col-
lapse of the wave function which has many other prop-
erties which suggest to rejected it, are deterministic. I
think that the prevailing view of indeterminism in the last
century is an accidental mistake of the evolution of Sci-
ence, similar to ether hypothesis rejected hundred years
ago.
III. PROBABILISTIC THEORIES
Laplace, the symbol of determinism in physics is also
the founder of probability calculus [9]. He denied that
there is an objective probability. The foundation of the
probability theory is a realistic and deterministic theory
with agents which are ignorant about some of the ontol-
ogy.
The interpretation of probability is still a very contro-
versial subject. The leading role in it plays de Finetti
who also forcefully claims that there is no such thing as
probability. It is only an effective concept of an ignorant
agent [10]:
My thesis, paradoxically, and a little
provocatively, but nonetheless genuinely, is
simply this:
PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST
The abandonment of superstitious beliefs
about the existence of the Phlogiston, the
Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time, . .
. or Fairies and Witches was an essential step
along the road to scientific thinking. Proba-
bility, too, if regarded as something endowed
with some kind of objective existence, is no
less a misleading misconception, an illusory
attempt to exteriorize or materialize our true
probabilistic beliefs.
(de Finetti, 1970)
The program of presenting quantum theory as an ob-
jective probability theory cannot use classical probabil-
ity theory since it assumes underlying definite values un-
known to some agents. These definite values can be con-
sidered as “hidden variables”. There are many limita-
tions of the type of possible hidden variables, so it was ac-
knowledged that probability theory underlying quantum
theory cannot be a classical probability theory [11, 12].
Spekkens, who introduced a toy model which serves as an
important test bed for many attempts in this direction,
understands it well [13]:
3It is important to bear in mind that one can-
not derive quantum theory from the toy the-
ory, nor from any simple modification thereof.
The problem is that the toy theory is a the-
ory of incomplete knowledge about local and
noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well
known that quantum theory cannot be un-
derstood in this way.
(Spekkens, 2007)
The program was put on the map long ago by Birkhoff
and von Neumann [14]. (See Pitowsky [15] for develop-
ment and defense of this position.) A significant effort to
find quantum theory emerging from probability calculus
is Quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory
(or QBism)[16, 17]. It should be mentioned that these
developments came from the feeling that quantum the-
ory cannot be understood in another way[16]:
In the quantum world, maximal information
is not complete and cannot be completed.
(Caves, Fuchs and Schack, 2002)
All authors of this program write that the quantum the-
ory is intrinsically probabilistic. The program made a
lot of technical progress borrowing results from flourish-
ing field of quantum information. Axiomatic approaches
of Popescu and Rohrlich [18] and Hardy [19] brought in-
teresting results. An operational approach to quantum
probability which was put forward by Davies and Lewis
[20], was developed today into “Generalized Probability
Theories,” (see recent review by Janotta and Hinrichsen
[21]) which combines probability theory with quantum
logic, the program envisioned by Birkhoff and Neumann
[14] long ago. Another post-classical probability theory, a
“convex-operational approach” is conceptually more con-
servative. It differs from classical probability only due to
rejection of the assumption that all measurements can
be made simultaneously [22]. More demanding is the
graphical framework for Bayesian inference [23] which
suggests replacing probability distributions with density
operators and an attempt to formulate quantum theory
as a causally neutral theory of Bayesian inference [24].
In my view, all these approaches are notoriously diffi-
cult. I agree with the predictions of Fro¨hlich and Shubnel
[12] regarding a gedanken poll among twenty-five grown
up physicists asked to express their views on the foun-
dations of quantum mechanics. It is indeed an “intellec-
tual scandal” that there is nothing close to a consensus
regarding the meaning of the most successful physical
theory we have. But I am one of those colleagues who
are convinced that “somewhat advanced mathematical
methods” are superfluous in addressing the problems re-
lated to the foundations of quantum mechanics, and I
turn off when I hear an expression such as “C?-algebra”
or “type-III factor”. I feel very comfortable with my ap-
proach. And indeed, as Fro¨hlich and Shubnel predicted,
“almost all of them are convinced that theirs is the only
sane point of view”, I do not see any other reasonable
option. If I shall see that my option, the MWI, fails, I
might turn to studying the operator algebra seriously.
I am skeptical about possibility to build quantum the-
ory as a variation of a probability theory because the
probabilistic aspects are not central in quantum theory.
The unprecedented success of quantum theory is in cal-
culation of spectrum of various elements, explaining sta-
bility of solids, superconductivity, superfluidity, etc. Ac-
cording to the probability theory approach to quantum
theory, it is stated that “the quantum state is a derived
entity, it is a device for the bookkeeping of probabilities ”
[15]. But, for deriving all the results I mentioned above, I
need the quantum state. It leads to an explanation for al-
most everything we observe in a very elegant and precise
way. I cannot imagine how to calculate, say, the spec-
trum of Hydrogen with probability distributions instead
of the quantum state. I am not aware of any explanation
of non-probabilistic results of the quantum theory from
some probability theory.
IV. UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
Arguably, the most influential result for today’s con-
sensus, that quantum theory is not a deterministic the-
ory, is the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. In 1927
Heisenberg [25] proved that an attempt to measure posi-
tion of a particle introduces uncertainty in its momentum
and vice versa.
∆x ∆p ≥ ~
2
. (1)
Today, a more common term is the Uncertainty Re-
lations, because attempts to derive quantum formalism
from the Uncertainty Principle failed until now. Heisen-
berg was vague regarding quantitative description of the
uncertainty. This is apparently the reason for the re-
cent controversy regarding experimental demonstration
of Heisenberg Uncertainty relations [26–30]. Uncertainty
Relations became a hot topic of a recent research not
just due to this controversy. Newly developed language
of quantum information provided a possibility for alter-
native formulations and derivations based on entropic un-
certainty relations. This direction was pioneered a while
ago by Deutsch [31] and development continues until to-
day [32].
The argument of Heisenberg for indeterminism was
that determinism as a starting port has a complete de-
scription of a system at the initial time. Inability to
prepare the system with precise position and momentum
does not allow precise prediction of the future. (In classi-
cal physics complete description of the system was a point
in the phase space: position and momentum.) Robertson
Uncertainty Relations [33] is a more general representa-
tion of uncertainty principle because it puts constraint
on the product of uncertainties of any pair of variables
4A,B:
∆A ∆B ≥ 1
2
|〈ψ|[A,B]|ψ〉| . (2)
A more important property of the Robertson Uncertainty
Relation is that it states not just that we have no means
to prepare a system with definite values of variables corre-
sponding to noncommuting operators, the quantum for-
malism does not have a description for this. The Heisen-
berg uncertainty, i.e. the absence of a preparation pro-
cedure for a system with well-defined values of noncom-
muting variables is necessary to avoid the contradiction
with the Robertson Uncertainty relation.
The fact that the Robertson Uncertainty Relation de-
pends on the quantum state of the system sometimes
considered as a weakness. The entropic approach to the
Uncertainty Relations starts from the assumption that
we deal here with probability distributions of values of
the observables and can have a form independent of a
particular quantum state. However, for the analysis of
questions of determinism, the uncertainty relations corre-
sponding to all states do not add much. The question is:
“Do the variables have certain values in a particular situ-
ation?” Thus, what is relevant is the original Robertson
Uncertainty Relation, (see its arguably simplest deriva-
tion [34]). It teaches us that the quantum formalism
does not allow definite values of variables correspond-
ing to noncommuting operators. And the formalism has
many pairs of such variables starting from position and
momentum. In Schro¨dinger representation of quantum
theory the wave function is the basic concept. Obviously,
typical wave function in position representation does not
provide a definite position of a particle.
Uncertainty relations tell us that observables cannot
have definite values in the framework of the quantum
theory. They do not rule out hidden variables theories
underlying quantum mechanics completing it in such a
way that the observables do have definite values. The
minimal disturbance meaning of the uncertainty relation
does not change it. Hidden variables theory which spec-
ifies a deterministic evolution of hidden variables is not
ruled out.
V. KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
Another apparently strong argument for the indeter-
minism related to the noncommutativity of operators
corresponding to quantum observables is the Kochen-
Specker theorem [35]. The theorem shows that assigning
definite values to a particular set of observables together
with the assumption that these values can be measured
such that the noncontextuality is respected, i.e. mea-
surements of commuting observables do not change the
measured values of each other, contradict predictions of
the quantum theory. The original proof was very compli-
cated and had a set of 117 projectors. A lot of effort has
been made to simplify it [36, 37], and recently a system
of just 13 projectors has been found [38]. These results
prove that at least some of the variables in the set do
not have definite values. It has been strengthened also
by a possibility to specify exactly which is provably value
indefinite [39].
In spite of the difficulty with experimental demonstra-
tion of Kochen-Specker contextuality in experiments with
finite precision [40, 41], Cabello [42] found a feasible pro-
posal and experiments have been performed [43, 44]. The
experiments confirm predictions of quantum theory.
Uncertainty relations taught us that in some cases ob-
servables cannot have definite values in the framework
of quantum theory. The Kochen-Specker Theorem goes
beyond it and puts constrains on the hidden variables
theories. There is no way to have a noncontextual the-
ory with definite values for quantum observables. But it
does not prove randomness. A hidden variable theory for
deterministic outcomes of all possible measurement is not
ruled out. In fact, contextuality of a hidden variable the-
ory is not something counterintuitive. An example of a
contextual hidden variable theory is Bohmian mechanics
described in Section IX. It demonstrates the contextual-
ity of a spin measurement in a very simple and natural
way. The “context” here is not a simultaneous measure-
ment of another observable. The context is a detailed
description of the measuring device which measures one
observable. The outcome of the measurement is deter-
ministic, but the observable, e.g. the spin component,
does not have a definite value.
VI. THE EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN
ARGUMENT
The formalism of the quantum mechanics with its two
basic concepts, namely quantum states and quantum ob-
servables, is an indeterministic theory due to the uncer-
tainty principle: in certain situations some observables do
not have definite values, the outcome of their measure-
ments is indeterminate before the measurement. This
is not what was expected from a good scientific theory
at that time, but it did not contradict anything. The
Kochen-Specker theorem showed that if we want to com-
plete the quantum theory to avoid indeterministic out-
comes, the hidden variables have to be “contextual”, but
it did not show a particular reason to complete the quan-
tum theory: there was no inconsistency between what
the theory predicts and what can be measured. In 1935
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [45] showed such a
reason.
The starting point of EPR was locality. They consid-
ered an entangled state which allowed measurement of
variables of one system by measuring another system far
away. They argued that these variables have to be def-
inite before the measurement since, due to locality, the
remote operation could not change it. If the values were
not definite, they could not be present in the location
of the remote measurement. The tension with quantum
5FIG. 1: The first two figures show the eigen states of the vari-
able x˜ which are the wave packets localized at points ±1 on
the x axis. The two figures in the bottom show the eigen states
of the variable y˜ which are superpositions of eigen states of x˜.
They become localized wave packets on a parallel axis (which
is named y) after passing through a vertical beam splitter.
The eigen states of x˜ passing through the beam spitter be-
come superpositions of the wave packets localized at ±1 on
the y axis.
theory was that in the set of these variables there were
noncommuting variables for which the uncertainty prin-
ciple does not allow to assign definite values simultane-
ously. The EPR expected that completing the quantum
theory with hidden variables which will assign definite
values to these variables is possible. Naturally for EPR,
the hidden variables were supposed to be local. Follow-
ing the analysis of Bohm and Aharonov [46], Bell [47]
showed that such local hidden variables do not exist.
The most vivid way to show this result is to consider
a three-particle entangled state, named the Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger state (GHZ) [48–50]. Let me present it
in an abstract form considering the dichotomic variables
x˜ and y˜ with the eigenvalues ±1 which are the coun-
terparts of the spin variables of a spin− 12 particle. The
connections between eigenstates of x˜ and y˜ are:
|y˜ = ±1〉 ≡ 1√
2
|(|x˜ = 1〉 ± |x˜ = 1〉). (3)
The variables x˜ and y˜ have a simple physical realiza-
tion for a photon, allowing actual experiments in a labo-
ratory. The eigenstates |x˜ = ±1〉 by definition are local-
ized wave packets at locations x = ±1, see Fig. 1. Thus,
measurement of x˜ is just a measurement of position. In
order to measure the variable y˜, the photon, i.e. its two
wave packets, should be sent through a properly placed
beam splitter and then the photon position should be
measured. The setup should be arranged such that the
superposition of the wave packets with the same phase
will interfere constructively at y = 1 and destructively at
y = −1, see Fig. 1.
Let us shorten the notation: |x˜ = +1〉A = |+〉xA etc.
Then the GHZ state is:
|GHZ〉 ≡ 1
2
[ |−〉xA |+〉xB |+〉xC + |+〉xA|−〉xB |+〉xC
+ |+〉xA|+〉xB |−〉xC − |−〉xA|−〉xB |−〉xC ].(4)
All terms of the GHZ state fulfill the property:
x˜A x˜B x˜C = −1. (5)
If we change the basis in two sites, say B and C, the
GHZ state can be written in the form:
|GHZ〉 = 1
2
[| − 〉xA|+〉yB |−〉yC + |−〉xA|−〉yB |+〉yC
− |+〉xA|−〉yB |−〉yC + |+〉xA|+〉yB |+〉yC ].(6)
Similar expression can be obtained for changing the basis
in other pairs of sites, so the GHZ state fulfills also the
relations:
x˜A y˜B y˜C = 1,
y˜A x˜B y˜C = 1, (7)
y˜A y˜B x˜C = 1.
When the system is in the GHZ state, we can measure
the local variables x˜ and y˜ at each site by measuring the
6FIG. 2: The observers at sites A, B, and C are asked simultaneously to measure x˜ or y˜ of their particles. This is just either
testing the presence of the particle at the locations x = ±1, or passing it through the beam splitter, and then testing the
presence of the particle at the locations y = ±1. Quantum theory predicts the correlations between the outcomes of these
measurements given by equations (5) and (7). Equation (8) shows that these correlations are inconsistent with the assumption
that the outcomes of the measurements are predetermined.
variables at other sites, see Fig. 2. The EPR argument
tells us then that these variables should have definite val-
ues, but relations (5),(7) tell us that this is impossible:
just take the product of all equations and we get a con-
tradiction:
x˜2Ax˜
2
Bx˜
2
C y˜
2
Ay˜
2
Bx˜
2
C = −1. (8)
If we want to believe that every measurement ends up
with a single outcome, namely the outcome which we ob-
serve, then the EPR-Bell-GHZ result forces us to reject
either locality or determinism. There is no local hidden
variable theory which is consistent with predictions of
quantum mechanics. Six variables x˜A, x˜B , x˜C , y˜A, y˜B , y˜C
cannot have definite values prior to measurement. They
are all locally measurable by detection photons in x =
±1 positions or, after passing the photon wave packets
through beam splitters, in y = ±1 positions. Assuming
locality, i.e. that the outcome of these measurements in
each site depends solely on what is in this site only, en-
sures indeterminism. Presence of instantaneous nonlocal
actions might save determinism: the definite values of
variables in various sites might be changed due to mea-
surements in other sites. Note that giving up determin-
ism does not save locality: particular outcomes at two
sites make, instantaneously, the values at the third site
definite.
Let us summarize what we have shown until now re-
garding a possibility to change quantum formalism to
make it a deterministic theory. The Uncertainty Re-
lations told us that we have to add hidden variables.
Kochen-Specker theorem told us that the hidden vari-
ables should be contextual. The EPR-Bell-GHZ result
proved that the hidden variables have to be nonlocal.
VII. THE MEANING OF THE WAVE
FUNCTION
In most of our discussion above, except for Section III,
the wave function Ψ was tacitly assumed as part of the
ontology. The discussion was about values of variables
which could not be definite, but the role of Ψ was not
questioned. The wave function considered to be ontic,
i.e. to be a description of reality, in contrast to epistemic,
corresponding to our knowledge of reality.
Even in the classic paper on statistical interpretation
[51] and in the stochastic model of Nelson [52], the onto-
logical role of Ψ was not denied. Recently, however, with
7a new trend to consider quantum theory as part of an in-
formation theory, possibilities of theories in which Ψ was
epistemic were extensively investigated. Somewhat iron-
ically, what brought the epistemic interpretation of Ψ to
the center of attention was a negative result by Pusey,
Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) [53]. Previously, the ques-
tion was: “Are there hidden variables in addition to Ψ,
now a central question became “Can hidden variables re-
place Ψ?” Can it be that the ontology is these hidden
variables, and Ψ is just an emergent phenomenon?
In the standard quantum mechanics Ψ is identified
with a set of preparation procedures (many different pro-
cedures correspond to the same Ψ). Another manifesta-
tion of Ψ is the set of probabilities for outcomes of all
possible measurements. Pure quantum mechanics tells
us that the systems obtained by identical or even by dif-
ferent preparation procedures but of the same state, are
identical.
Usually, the existence of hidden variables denies that
for every single system prepared in a state Ψ, the out-
comes of measurements are uncertain, (or at least denies
that they are given by the quantum probability formula).
Instead, the outcomes are fixed by the hidden variables.
The presence of the same ontological Ψ for every instance
of corresponding preparation procedure is not denied, as
it explains the future evolution of the system in case the
measurement is not performed.
The epistemic Ψ is the idea that every preparation
procedure corresponding to Ψ ends up with a particu-
lar ontological state λi (the hidden variable) and only
distribution of parameters λi in an ensemble of identi-
cal preparations is what corresponds to Ψ. Different Ψs
correspond to different distributions. But then we can
imagine that a quantum system might have the the same
ontic state λi when prepared in different wave functions
Ψ and Ψ′. PBR proved that it is not possible, i.e. that
the overlapping distributions of hidden variables for dif-
ferent quantum states contradict predictions of quantum
mechanics. Thus, the wave function must be ontic as
well.
The PBR proof involved analysis of two quantum sys-
tems and measurements of entangled states of the com-
posite system. They assumed that if we have two sys-
tems, then their hidden variables not only specify the
outcomes of separate measurements on each system, but
also outcomes of measurements of entangled states of the
composite system. One can imagine that there are sep-
arate ontic hidden variables for each pair or each set of
systems specifying the outcomes of measurements per-
formed on composite systems. This contradicts the PBR
assumptions and it is not a particularly attractive pro-
posal, but it is a possibility, so the PBR proof is not
unconditional. Note a parallel between the PBR and
Bell’s result [47]: Bell showed that there are no hidden
variables for each system explaining outcomes of local
measurements performed on two quantum systems in an
entangled state, while PBR showed that there are no hid-
den variables for each system explaining the outcomes of
a measurement of a variable with entangled eigen states
performed on the two systems prepared in a product
state.
Hardy [54] proves inconsistency of the overlapping dis-
tributions based on another assumption which he named
“ontic indifference”: the operations which do not change
Ψ also do not change the underlying hidden variables
(more precisely, there exist an implementation for oper-
ations on hidden variables with such a property). Patra
et al. [55] reached similar conclusions assuming a cer-
tain “continuity assumption” according to which small
enough change of Ψ does not lead to the change of λi.
An experiment [56] ruled out some of the epistemic mod-
els which predict deviations from the standard quantum
theory.
Colbeck and Renner [57] claimed to resolve the issue
of the meaning of Ψ based only on “the assumption that
measurement settings can be chosen freely” (FR). Their
conclusion is that “a systems wave function is in one-to-
one correspondence with its elements of reality”. This
conclusion is what I wish to obtain. However, unfortu-
nately, I was not convinced by their formal arguments.
The Colbeck and Renner result heavily relies on their
previous claim that “No extension of quantum theory can
have improved predictive power” [58] based on the same
FR assumption. This work, however seems to me circu-
lar. They assume that the present quantum theory is cor-
rect and that the extension is accessible. Then, if this ex-
tension can help to predict some outcomes, it will violate
statistical prediction of quantum theory. Bohmian Me-
chanics, which is the most successful extension of quan-
tum theory is not ruled out by the Colbeck-Renner anal-
ysis because Bohmian positions are not accessible by defi-
nition. In [58] Colbeck and Renner wrote instead that the
Bohmian theory does not fall under the category of their
analysis because it contradicts their the FR assumption
of the free choice of measurement settings. See Ghirardi
and Romano [59] for detailed analysis of their FR as-
sumption and Laudisa [60] for an illuminating discussion
of Colbeck-Renner and other “no-go” quantum theorems
(cf Bell’s work on “no-go” quantum theorems [61]).
Although what I analyze in this paper is supposed to
explain everything, the whole physical Universe which in-
cludes even more than just one world we are aware of, my
attitude is that it is enough to have a satisfactory theory
for a closed system, for a small box with a few particles,
for a room with an observer, for the planet Earth. The
theory supposed to answer correctly about the result of
every experiment we imagine to perform on this system.
In particular, any preparation, any intermediate distur-
bances, any intermediate and final measurements should
be considered without constraints. We, outside the closed
system, have a complete “free choice” of our actions. I
am ready to extrapolate that if the experiments confirm
all the results for which we are capable to calculate the
predictions according to our theory, it also explains well
our Universe in which there are no agents with “free will”
to make the choice of various options in quantum exper-
8iments. Thus, I am not worried about “The Free Will
Theorem” [62].
As Harrigan and Spekkens admit [63], today there is
no serious candidate for an epistemic model of Ψ. More-
over, recent research, notably by Montina [64] and very
recently by Leifer [65] does not lead us to expect that the
complexity of such a model will be smaller than that of
the standard quantum theory. The large complexity of
classical models underlying quantum seems to be neces-
sary for explaining the huge difference between the power
of a qubit versus the power of a bit for various informa-
tion tasks [66, 67]. The wave function provides a simple
and elegant explanation of these protocols. The strongest
motivation for the ontology of Ψ is one of the oldest: it
provides the simplest explanation for the particle inter-
ference.
The work on protective measurements [68] also sup-
ports the ontological view of Ψ. The fact that we can ob-
serve the wave function (until today only in a gedanken
experiment) of a single particle suggests that it is the
ontological property of the particle. However, it is not a
decisive argument since observation of the wave function
requires long time interaction and “protection” of the
state. It is possible that the protection procedure acts on
the elements of reality λi enforcing its motion such that
its average during the time of protective measurement
will create the shape of the wave function. The chances
to have such a mechanism seem slim. We already have a
theory, and not a very simple one: the quantum theory
describing unitary evolution of the wave function which
makes specific predictions for the results of many possi-
ble measurements. The alternative theory should provide
identical, or at least very similar, predictions and in many
very different situations. It should work for all Hamilto-
nians in which the quantum wave we consider is one of
the eigenfunctions. It should work also for all kinds of
frequent projection measurements on the quantum state
in question.
At the early days of quantum theory, the motivation
for a search of an epistemic interpretation of quantum
theory was a sentiment for classical physics explanation
which was considered to be very successful before the
quantum theory appeared. Also, the success of statis-
tical mechanics in explaining thermodynamics suggested
that a similar relation might exist between classical and
quantum theories. Later, when the quantum theory ex-
plained with unprecedented precision the majority of ob-
served physical phenomena, the main motivation for an
epistemic interpretation was its simple and elegant expla-
nation of the collapse of Ψ in quantum theory, “an ugly
scar on what would be a beautiful theory if it could be re-
moved” [69]. Nowadays, the explosion of the works ana-
lyzing epistemic approach [70–74] which however, mostly
produce negative results, can be explained by the devel-
opment of quantum information theory which provides
new tools which make these analyses possible. The “pos-
itive” result [75], showing a possibility of Ψ-epistemic
model, seems to me not convincing because this proposal
is too conspiratorial.
I find no real motivation for epistemic interpretation
of Ψ and in the rest of the paper I will concentrate on
the interpretations in which Ψ has ontological meaning,
what is today frequently named as ontic interpretation
of Ψ.
VIII. COLLAPSE MODELS
Quantum system, according to von Neumann [76],
evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation between
measurements at which it collapses to the eigenstate of
the measured variable. The problem with this simple
prescription is that there is no definition what is “mea-
surement” [77]. The concept is frequently “clarified” by
a statement that measurement happens when “macro-
scopic” measuring device makes a recording which only
replaces one ill-defined concept by another. Von Neu-
mann understood it well and he added a proof that for
all practical purposes, i.e. for all observed experimen-
tal results, it is not important where exactly we place
the “cut”, the point when measurement really happens.
While this proof allows us to use quantum theory for
predicting results and building useful devices, it does not
allow us to consider quantum theory as a description of
Nature. I believe that the latter is not just philosophical
and academic question. Answering it might lead to better
ways for predicting results of experiments and designing
useful devices.
At 1976 Pearle [78] proposed a mechanism for the
physical collapse of Ψ by adding a nonlinear term to
Schro¨dinger equation. Ten years later Ghirardi, Rimini
and Weber [79] (GRW) proposed much simpler but ad
hoc physical postulate which, followed support by Bell
[80], triggered an extensive development of the collapse
program. The most promising direction is the Continu-
ous Spontaneous Localization (CSL) models started by
Pearle [81], and significantly developed using the GRW
ideas [82]. In the main approach, the wave function Ψ
is the ontology. Thus, the quantum interference is ex-
plained as in any other wave phenomena. The evolution
of Ψ is, however, not unitary. The Schro¨dinger evolution
is modified by some explicitly random element. Random-
ness is the property of all collapse proposals. The ongoing
research is to add some physical explanation why the ran-
dom collapse occurs. Note gravitation induced collapse
proposals by Diosi and Penrose [83, 84].
In the GRW proposal, the wave function of every parti-
cle is multiplied at a random time, on average once in τ =
108 years, by a Gaussian with a width of d = 10−5cm.
The location of the center of the Gaussian is chosen ran-
domly but in proportion to |Ψ|2. In experiments with a
few particles these GRW “hits” usually are not observ-
able, because they are very rare. If we have a well local-
ized macroscopic body, these hits also will not do much.
Electrons in atoms are localized with a width of the order
of 10−8cm, so multiplication by a much wider Gaussian
9does not modify the wave function significantly. The sit-
uation is different if a macroscopic body, say a pointer, is
in a superposition of being in two well separated places.
Very fast, at least one particle of the body will be mul-
tiplied by the GRW Gaussian which will localize, due to
the entanglement between the particles in the pointer,
the whole pointer to one position.
The GRW proposal is phenomenological, ungrounded
in more fundamental physics, as are the CSL models with
recent arguments for uniqueness [85, 86]. But even the
GRW program of the dynamical collapse is a physical
theory which is a candidate for a complete description of
Nature. We do not need any additional clarification of
the concepts: What is a measurement? What is macro-
scopic? The theory tells us when it is probable that the
collapse takes place and this can be considered as the
time when a quantum measurement procedure ends with
a particular result.
In a setup of a quantum measurement which shows the
outcome by positioning a pointer having a macroscopic
number of atoms, the theory predicts a reasonable behav-
ior. The “cut” between the quantum superposition stage
and the collapsed state is in the reasonable place: the
pointer stays in a superposition of macroscopically differ-
ent states for an extremely short time. Albert and Vaid-
man [87] noted that in some other setups the “cut” placed
by the GRW might be far beyond the time one might ex-
pect. Although “macroscopic” is not rigorously defined,
it seems natural to consider 1010 atoms as a macroscopic
object. So, we would expect from a collapse model to
cause a very fast reduction of a superposition of states in
which all atoms are excited and in which all atoms are
in their ground state. However, if the difference in the
size of the electron cloud in the excited and the ground
states is much smaller than 10−5cm, then the GRW hit
does not lead to a significant change of the wave func-
tion of an individual electron, and thus does not lead to
the collapse of the superposition. Completely different
pictures on a screen “drawn” by areas of such excited
atoms are not “macroscopically different” according to
the GRW precise definition.
Consider a Stern-Gerlach experiment measuring spin
in the z direction of a particle prepared with the spin
“up” in the x direction. First, consider a measuring de-
vice which shows the result using macroscopic pointer
starting in R (READY) position and ending up in R or
Y (YES) position signifying detection of the particle, see
Fig. 3a. The unitary evolution leads to a superposition of
two macroscopically different pointer positions, but then,
the first GRW hit on one of the atoms of the pointer will
localize the pointer to one position. If, however, the de-
tector is just a plate in which numerous atoms are excited
around the place the atom hits the plate, the GRW hits
will not eliminate the superposition of different sets of a
macroscopic number of excited atoms, see Fig. 3b.
It has been shown [88] that this does not lead to an
observable difference because the GRW mechanism col-
lapses the wave function when the neurons of the visual
FIG. 3: a). The Stern-Gerlach experiment with pointer dis-
plays. R refers to READY position and Y to YES position of
the pointer which signifies detection of the atom. The super-
position of the wave packets of the atom creates an entangled
superposition of the two pointers which collapses almost to
a product state due to the first GRW hit. b). The Stern-
Gerlach experiment with a screen display. The superposition
of the wave packets of the atom creates an entangled superpo-
sition of the internal states of a macroscopic number of atoms
on the screen. This superposition does not collapse due to
the GRW hits, so the definite result of the measurement will
take place at a much later stage.
cortex of the observer’s brain transmit the signal. Still,
it seems a weakness of the collapse model that in this
example the von Neumann cut should be put so close to
the human perception. We would expect that a physical
theory will tell us that what we see is what is, but here
we are told that we play an active role in creating the
reality by our observation. In every quantum textbook
we read that quantum measurements play an active role
in forming the “reality”, but it seems that the measuring
devices should be responsible for this, not our brains.
There is another aspect in which the GRW collapse
apparently provides less than the von Neumann collapse.
According to the von Neumann, at the end of the mea-
surement process, the part of the wave corresponding to
the outcome which was not found, disappears completely.
In the Stern-Gerlach experiment with a pointer display,
Fig. 3a, after the measurement, there will be a quantum
state describing the pointer just in one position. The
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process can be described as follows:
1√
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉)|R〉A|R〉B →
→ 1√
2
(|↑〉|Y 〉A|R〉B + |↓〉|R〉A|Y 〉B)→
→ |↑〉|Y 〉A|R〉B , (9)
where |Y 〉A signifies “YES”, the state of the upper detec-
tor detecting the atom, |R〉B signifies the lower detector
in the state “READY”, etc. The GRW provides similar,
but not exactly the same evolution:
1√
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉)|R〉A|R〉B →
1√
2
(|↑〉|Y 〉A|R〉B + |↓〉|R〉A|Y 〉B)→
→ N (|↑〉|Y 〉A|R〉B + e− l
2
2d2 |↓〉|R〉A|Y 〉B),(10)
where d = 10−5cm is the GHZ parameter and l ' 5cm is
the distance between the atom in the pointer which was
“hit” by the GRW collapse mechanism in the READY
and YES positions.
This is the GRW tail problem [89–91]. The wave func-
tion after the measurement according to the GRW is a
superposition of the state corresponding to one outcome
with an amplitude close to 1 and the state corresponding
to the other outcome with an exponentially small ampli-
tude. With time, this amplitude will be reduced very fast
to even smaller values. In my view, as presented, it is still
a weakness of the theory. The absolute value of the am-
plitude does not change the experience of the observers
having such an amplitude. It seems that the GRW mech-
anism fails to perform the task it was constructed for: to
eliminate all but one of the outcomes of a quantum mea-
surement. True, it singles out one outcome as the only
one having a large amplitude, but it apparently leaves the
other outcomes coexisting. The GRW proponents have
to explain: “How do I know that I am not the one in the
tail branch?”
A popular attempt to overcome this difficulty is to de-
fine a cutoff declaring that if the amplitude of a branch
is smaller than some number, then this branch can be
neglected. I do not find this proposal appealing. I see,
however, another resolution of the GRW tails problem.
The GRW mechanism literary speaking “kills” the tail
branches.
Consider the wave function of an electron of an atom
in the pointer being in a superposition of two readings
after the hit by a Gaussian, Fig. 4a. The center of the
Gaussian will be at the location of an atom corresponding
to one of the positions of the pointer. Since the width
of the Gaussian is three orders of magnitude larger than
the diameter of the electron wave function in the atom
D ' 10−8cm, the atom will not change its state. On
the other hand, the center of the Gaussian will be at
a macroscopic distance l from the nucleus of the atom
in the other position of the pointer. The wave function
of the electron in the atom ψ(r) will be multiplied by
e−
(r−l)2
2d2 . It will not be just multiplied by a small number,
it will be severely disturbed. Indeed, the part of the
wave function which is far from the center will be reduced
relative the part which is close to the center by the factor
e−
(l+D)2
2d2 /e−
l2
2d2 ' e− lDd2 ' 10−4. (11)
Clearly, the atom will change its state and most probably
will be ionized. Thus, the final term in (10) describes well
the situation after the first GRW hit up to a disturbed
state of one atom in the tail of the wave function. But
very soon, numerous other atoms in the tail wave func-
tion of the pointer will be severely disturbed, see Fig. 4a.
After a short time the pointer will disintegrate in the tail
wave function up to a situation that we should say that
the pointer is not there anymore. Fig. 4b. shows the
disappearance of the tails states of the detectors in the
Stern-Gerlach experiment.
In the same way, the GRW mechanism in a situation of
a human observer being in a superposition of macroscop-
ically different positions immediately kills the person in
all tail branches and reduces the wave function to a sin-
gle stable branch of the person. There is no way to have
conscious beings in more than one branch in the GRW ap-
proach. This, together with the smallness of tails (which
is necessary for having our existence plausible) resolves
the tail problem.
The collapse models are observably different from the
standard quantum mechanics. The GRW collapse mech-
anism leads to a tiny energy non-conservation [92, 93].
These effects were not found [94–96], so the original GRW
proposal was ruled out, but some of its modifications and
some CSL models are still possible [97].
In recent years there have been proposed modifications
in viewing the ontology of the collapse models. In addi-
tion to Ψ the “mass density” [98] and “flashes” [99, 100]
that are responsible for the random collapses were sug-
gested as ontological entities. Adding other ontological
entities besides Ψ seems to me (and to Albert [101]) un-
wanted. I view the strength of collapse models that they
do not require anything like hidden variables to avoid plu-
rality of worlds. We can consider GRW hitting process
and the CSL fluctuating field as part of the physical law
and take Ψ as the only ontology. (Surely it is less rad-
ical than considering the wave function of the Universe
as a law of motion of Bohmian particles [102].) Appar-
ently, the reason for introducing additional ontology is
the difficulty to explain our experience based on Ψ ontol-
ogy only [103]. In Sec XI I will show how our experience
can be explained in a satisfactory way based solely on Ψ,
so it is not necessary to introduce the “mass density” or
“flashes” ontology.
An interesting option to obtain an effective collapse
without introducing any complicated dynamics is to ac-
cept that there are two ontological wave functions, the
usual one evolving toward the future, specified by the
boundary condition in the past, and another one evolving
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FIG. 4: a). The dynamics of the GRW collapse of the wave function of the pointer in superposition. The first GRW hit
collapses the amplitude of the tail pointer state to a very small number. The following hits quickly destroy the tail state of the
pointer such that the pointer disintegrates. b). In the Stern-Gerlach experiment, Fig. 3a, the GRW hits lead to a single stable
structure of the pointer’s states. (R refers to READY position and Y to YES position of the pointer which signifies detection
of the particle.)
backward in time, specified by the boundary conditions
in the future [104–106]. The boundary conditions in the
future should correspond to the results of all measure-
ments in the Universe and thus replacing all the collapses
which were supposed to happen. The outcomes of these
measurements provide the real part of weak values [107]
of measured values which describe well the world we ex-
perience. It is apparently a consistent proposal, and the
high price of a very complicated backward evolving wave
function maybe reasonable for avoiding collapse. I think,
however, that the multiple worlds are not as problematic
as they are usually viewed, so the conspiracy of the spe-
cific backward evolving wave function is a too high price
for avoiding parallel worlds [108].
IX. BOHMIAN MECHANICS
By far the most successful hidden variables theory is
the Bohmian mechanics. It is a deterministic theory ca-
pable to explain the appearance of probability. It re-
produces all predictions of quantum theory but it also
provides a convincing explanation of quantum peculiar
phenomena. It provides a solution of quantum measure-
ment problem reproducing an effective collapse of the
wave function. It nicely demonstrates noncontextuality
and beautifully explains the EPR-Bell-GHZ correlations.
It is a candidate for a final theory of the world. One
of the reasons for its popularity is that the Bohmian pic-
ture of reality is close to the Laplacian picture. The world
is a collection of particles with well-defined trajectories.
The law of evolution of Bohmian particles is more subtle
than Newton’s laws and it requires Ψ which also obtains
an ontological status.
De Broglie [109] was first to suggest a version of the
Bohmian mechanics in 1927 but he changed his position,
presenting a significantly different view later [110]. Bohm
[111] made a clear exposition of the theory in 1952, al-
though he never viewed it as a proposal for a final theory.
For Bohm it was a way for developing a new and better
approach. The motions of “particles” in the de Broglie
and Bohm theories are identical, but the important dif-
ference between these formulations is that de Broglie
used an equation for velocity (determined by the quan-
tum state) as the guiding equation for the particle, while
Bohm used the equation for acceleration (a la Newton)
introducing a “quantum potential” (likewise determined
by the quantum state). The version I find the most at-
tractive was advocated by Bell [112] and it is closer to
de Broglie as the equation of motion is given in terms
of the velocity. An important aspect is that the only
“Bohmian” variables in this approach are particle posi-
tions, and all other variables (e.g. spin) are described
solely by the quantum state.
The ontology of the Bohmian mechanics consists of the
wave function Ψ and the trajectories of all particles in
three-dimensional space. The quantum state evolves ac-
cording to the Schro¨dinger equation (or, more precisely,
according to its relativistic generalization) and it never
collapses. It is completely deterministic, the value of the
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FIG. 5: When the standard quantum theory predicts an equal probability for the results of the Stern-Gerlach experiment, the
Bohmian position in the lower half of the wave packet of the particle ensures that it will be detected by the lower detector.
Depending on the type of the Stern-Gerlach magnet, this will correspond to the results: spin “down” or spin “up”. (R refers
to READY position and Y to YES position of the pointer which signifies detection of the particle.)
wave function at any single time determines the wave
function at all times in the future and in the past. Ev-
ery particle has a definite position at all times and its
motion is governed in a simple deterministic way by the
quantum state. The velocity of each particle at a par-
ticular time depends on the wave function and positions
of all the particles at that time. Namely, the velocity of
particle i at time t is given by:
r˙i(t) = Im
~
m
Ψ† (r1, . . . rN , t)∇iΨ (r1, . . . rN , t)
Ψ† (r1, . . . rN , t) Ψ (r1, . . . rN , t)
∣∣∣∣∣
ri=ri(t)
.
(12)
(We use Roman text font for Bohmian positions and bold
font to signify that Ψ is a spinor.) This velocity formula
ensures that a Bohmian particle inside a moving wave
packet which has group velocity v “rides” on the wave
with the same velocity, r˙ = v.
It is postulated that the initial distribution of Bohmian
positions of particles is according to the Born rule, i.e.
proportional to |Ψ(r)|2. Then, the guiding equation en-
sures that this Born law distribution will remain forever.
In fact, even if the Bohmian position of a particular sys-
tem starts in a low probability region, due to interactions
with other systems it will typically move to a high prob-
ability point very rapidly [113, 114]. Thus, postulating
an initial Born rule distribution might not be necessary.
However, some restrictions on the initial Bohmian po-
sition are unavoidable: it cannot be where Ψ(r) = 0.
We have not seen deviations from the standard quantum
theory, so I find it preferable to keep the initial Born
distribution postulate in Bohmian theory. It is possible,
however, that cosmological considerations might lead to
dynamical origin of the Born rule [115]).
If we want to consider observables of quantum theory
as basic concepts, the Bohmian mechanics demonstrates
contextuality. When the wave function and the Bohmian
positions of all particles are given, the outcomes of mea-
surements of the observables might not be fixed. This
statement does not contradict the determinism of the
Bohmian mechanics: the outcome of every experiment is
predetermined. However, different experimental setups
for measurements of the same observable might lead to
different observed values. The “context” here is not a
simultaneous measurement of another observable as in
Kochen-Specker theorem. The context is a detailed de-
scription of the measuring device which measures a single
observable.
Consider a Stern-Gerlach measurement of a spin z
component of a spin− 12 particle prepared initially “up”
in the x direction. Quantum mechanics predicts equal
probability for “up” and “down” spin z outcomes. In a
Stern-Gerlach experiment the particle passes through an
inhomogeneous magnetic field and the “up” and “down”
components end up in different places, Fig 3. Assume
that “up” spin goes to an upper place and “down” spin
goes to the lower spot. Spin x state is a superposition of
spin z “up” and “down” and thus, the quantum theory
does not tell us where the particle will end.
The Bohmian quantum mechanics is a determinis-
tic theory and given the quantum state and the initial
Bohmian position, the future is definite. The analysis
here is simple [116], Fig. 5. The Bohmian position has
to be inside the wave packet of the particle. If it is in
the lower part, the particle will end up in the lower spot.
Indeed, before the wave packet reaches the Stern-Gerlach
magnet, the Bohmian particle rides in a particular posi-
tion of the wave packet (assuming it does not spread out
significantly). When the magnet splits the wave packet
to the two components moving up and down correspond-
ing to the spin component values, the Bohmian position,
being in the overlap, will continue to move horizontally
(we assumed here for simplicity the constant density of
the wave packets) until one of the wave packets will move
away and the Bohmian position will be solely in one wave
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packet. If the Bohmian position was in the lower part, it
will end up riding on the wave packet moving down, i.e.
the spin z measurement will show “down”.
The Bohmian mechanics does not have a value for
the spin. The outcome depends on the way we per-
form the experiment. It is considered a legitimate spin-
measurement if we change the magnet in our device such
that the gradient of the spin z component changes its
sign [117]. The only difference is that now landing in the
lower spot corresponds to measuring spin z “up”. With
the same initial wave function and the same Bohmian
particle position, the particle, being in the lower part of
the wave packet will end up in the lower spot again. But
now this means that spin z is “up”. Everything is deter-
ministic, but an observable, the spin z component, does
not have a definite value.
In Bohmian theory spin sometimes gets special treat-
ment [118], so it is better to consider the contextuality in
an example which does not include spin. Let us consider
position related variables x˜ and y˜ which are counterparts
of the spin variables discussed in Section VI, see (3) and
Fig. 1.
The analogue of the Stern-Gerlach experiment above
is the measurement of y˜ on a particle starting in the state
|x˜ = 1〉. Similarly to the Stern-Gerlach experiment, if the
Bohmian particle is placed in the right half of the initial
wave packet, it will end in the right wave packet. The
simple argument allowing to derive Bohmian trajectory
in the Stern-Gerlach experiment is not exactly applicable
here because the two wave packets (transmitted and re-
flected) create an interference picture when overlap, but
as shown in [116], the modification of the Bohmian tra-
jectory can be neglected. There is a freedom in building
the beam splitter which distinguishes between the y˜ = 1
and y˜ = −1. It can be arranged that |y˜ = 1〉 goes to
the left instead of going to the right. With our initial
conditions, |x˜ = 1〉 and the Bohmian particle in the right
half of the wave packet, the particle, independently of the
choice of the beam splitter, will be “taken” by the wave
packet going to the right. This corresponds now to the
outcome y˜ = −1. Thus, we have a deterministic outcome
of the experiment, but we do not have definite value of
y˜. It is contextual on the design of our measuring device.
Let us consider now how Bohmian mechanics deals
with the GHZ setup, Fig 2. Since each particle is max-
imally entangled with the two other particles, at each
site there is an equal probability for every outcome of
measurements of x˜ and y˜. The outcome of each measure-
ment depends on where exactly the Bohmian position of
each particle is present and what type of the beam split-
ter is chosen. The results of the x˜A, x˜B , and x˜C , are
determined by the Bohmian positions for the particles
only, while the results of the y˜A, y˜B , and y˜C , depend on
the Bohmian positions and the types of the beam split-
ters. This leads to an apparent paradox: by changing the
beam splitters we can flip the outcome of, say, y˜C mea-
surement, but the GHZ state requires exact correlations
(7) between x˜A, y˜B , and y˜C .
The Bohmian mechanics provides a very elegant expla-
nation, see Fig. 6. The Bohmian positions indeed fix the
outcomes of the x˜ measurements at all sites. Also, we
can, by changing the type of the beam splitter, change
the outcome of the y˜ measurement at each site. However,
the latter is true when we perform the first y˜ measure-
ment. After, say, y˜B is measured, the outcome of y˜C
measurement becomes fixed. It should fulfill the condi-
tion x˜A y˜B y˜C = 1 and the outcome of x˜A is fixed even
if it has not been measured yet.
The velocity formula (12) explains the motion of
Bohmian particles, but we can see it more easily using
an equivalent, but more transparent form of this formula
by separating it into two steps [119]. First, a conditional
wave function of particle i at a particular time is defined
by fixing the positions of all other particle to be their
Bohmian positions at that time:
ψi(ri, t) = Ψ (r1, . . . , ri, . . . , rN , t) . (13)
The velocity of the ith particle is then:
r˙i =
~
m
Im
ψ∗i∇ψi
ψ∗i ψi
∣∣∣∣
ri=ri(t)
. (14)
To see how the Bohmian mechanism works, let us as-
sume that originally all Bohmian particles are in the left
wave packets and that y˜ = 1 eigenstates move to the
right. (We cannot assume that all Bohmian particles
are in the right wave packets because there is no term
|+〉xA|+〉xB |+〉xC in the GHZ state (4).) This fixes the
outcomes of all x˜ measurements whenever they are per-
formed and fixes the outcome y˜ = −1 for any y˜ measure-
ment which is performed before others. Indeed, consider
the y˜B measurement. The Bohmian position starts at the
left wave packet and at the beam splitter it reaches the
overlap of |+〉yB and |−〉yB , where it stops its horizontal
motion. The wave packet |+〉yB continues to move and
the particle is left in the wave packet |−〉yB which takes it
to the left. At that moment the conditional wave func-
tion at C changes to |+〉yC . Now it does not matter that
the Bohmian position at C is in the left wave packet. At
C, after the beam splitter, due to the interference of the
conditional wave function, there will be only the wave
packet moving to the right and the Bohmian position of
particle C will have to go to the right independently of
its initial location. This will correspond to the outcome
y˜C = 1. The requirement x˜A y˜B y˜C = (−1)(−1)1 = 1 is
fulfilled.
The contextuality is present here as in the case of a sin-
gle particle Stern-Gerlach measurement. Changing the
type of the beam splitter in y˜B measurement will not
change the fact that the Bohmian position will go to the
left in site B, but will change the outcome of this mea-
surement to y˜B = 1. More importantly, the change of the
beam splitter in B will change the outcome of the mea-
surement in site C to y˜C = −1. The Bohmian particle
will go to the left (if the beam splitter in C has not been
changed). This is an action at a distance! Action at B
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FIG. 6: a) All Bohmian positions in the GHZ setup are placed in the wave packets x˜ = −1. This ensures x˜A = x˜B = x˜C = −1
and y˜A = y˜B = y˜C = −1 if only one of the measurements is performed and the beam splitters are chosen with y˜ = 1 on the
right. b) After the measurement of y˜B (passing of the wave packets through the beam splitter is enough) the conditional wave
function of the particle in C collapses to |y˜C = 1〉. This ensures fulfillment of x˜Ay˜B y˜C = 1.
changes the outcome of the measurement in C immedi-
ately after. (See Bell’s discussion of this “curious feature
of Bohmian trajectories” [120].)
Another way to act on the outcome of y˜C measure-
ment, which is more closely related to the Kochen-
Specker theorem, is to decide not to make the measure-
ment in B. Then, given our initial quantum state and
the Bohmian positions in the left, the outcome will be
y˜C = −1. This will force the outcome y˜B = 1 if y˜B will
be measured later in B. Although we can change out-
comes by local action at a far away location, there is no
way to send signals. Our preparation procedure allows
us to know the quantum state of the particles, but not
their Bohmian positions.
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Measurement action in B changes the conditional wave
function in C. This is frequently considered as an ef-
fective collapse generated by Bohmian mechanics. This
“collapse”, however, is very different from the collapse of
von Neumann (9) or the GRW collapse (10). The stage
of a macroscopic superposition corresponding to the in-
termediate terms of (9) and (10) does not appear in the
Bohmian conditional wave function. Indeed, the macro-
scopic number of particles of the pointer will not be in a
superposition of macroscopically different states for any
period of time. Instead of (9) or (10), the measurement
process for the conditional wave function is a direct tran-
sition:
1√
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉)|R〉A|R〉B → |↑〉|Y 〉A|R〉B . (15)
Apart from the different outcomes of the spin measure-
ment, Fig. 5 and Fig. 4b demonstrate the difference be-
tween the “collapse” of the Bohmian conditional wave
functions of the pointers and the GRW collapse of the
wave functions of the pointers in the Stern-Gerlach ex-
periment.
The elegant explanation of the EPR experiment shows
also a serious drawback of the Bohmian theory. If a mea-
surement in C happens shortly after the measurement in
B, then for another Lorentz observer the measurement in
C happens first. Then, to explain the outcome y˜C = 1,
the moving Lorentz observer will need a different picture
of Bohmian positions. So the elegant explanation is not
covariant. Accepting the existence of a preferred Lorentz
frame is a too big price for the interpretational advan-
tages the Bohmian mechanics provides.
A much less serious problem of the Bohmian interpre-
tation is that it forces us to declare that certain position
measurement devices, perfectly faithful in all other in-
terpretations, have improper design, i.e. they incorrectly
show the position of Bohmian particles [116]. The coun-
terintuitive behavior of the Bohmian trajectories was
pointed out by Bell [112], but the fact that such situations
can lead to “fooling” a detector was found by Englert et
al. [121]. To be faithful, a device for the measurement of
position of a particle should record it in real time in the
Bohmian position of some other particle.
In my view, the most serious objection to Bohmian
mechanics is that it requires the ontological status of the
wave function Ψ which includes the structures of multiple
worlds. It does not collapse to a wave function of a single
world as von Neumann says, it does not collapse to a
single wave function of a sensible world as in the GRW
theory, it remains with the MWI wave function. I do not
have a good answer to the question: “How do I know
that it is not my empty wave that writes this paper and
it is not your empty wave who reads it?”
We need to add a postulate that our experience super-
venes on Bohmian positions and not on the wave func-
tion. This postulate does not change our mathematical
theory or ontological picture of the physical Universe.
But it is an important physical postulate since it tells us
where we are placed in the ontology of the Universe.
In the next section I will analyze a many Bohmian
worlds interpretation. It resolves the problem I raised
with my question, since it avoids empty waves. It allows
introducing probabilities of results of quantum experi-
ments in a much simpler way than it is done in the pure
MWI and it will help analyzing the problems of proba-
bility in other models.
X. MULTIPLE BOHMIAN WORLDS
I have not answered in a clear way two questions within
a Bohmian theory formalism: How to explain a particu-
lar choice of Nature for Bohmian positions of particles?
Why empty waves having the structure of familiar worlds
do not correspond to anything in our experience? A sim-
ple suggestion avoiding both questions is to accept an
actual existence of all possible Bohmian particle config-
urations. I am aware of the first proposal of this type by
Tipler [122] (this preprint also promotes determinism of
quantum theory). Tipler writes:
... the square of the wave function measures,
not a probability density, but a density of
Universes in the multiverse.
(Tipler 2006)
Valentini writes about this proposal [123]:
There can be no splitting or fusion of worlds.
The above ‘de Broglie-Bohm multiverse’ then
has the same kind of ‘trivial’ structure that
would be obtained if one reified all the possi-
ble trajectories for a classical test particle in
an external field: the parallel worlds evolve
independently, side by side. Given such a the-
ory, on the grounds of Occam’s razor alone,
there would be a conclusive case for taking
only one of the worlds as real.
(Valentini, 2010)
I am not convinced here. The classical and quantum
cases are not identical. In classical physics there is no
preference of one trajectory relative to the other. So
indeed, making all trajectories real does not help in ex-
plaining anything. In quantum case we do see a difference
between worlds: we bet differently on various outcomes
of quantum measurements. If density of Bohmian worlds
can provide an explanation for our betting behaviour it
would be a justification of Tipler’s proposal.
There are other recent proposals to consider a contin-
uum or a multitude of Bohmian worlds. They differ in
what they consider ontological and some other details.
All of them are trying to assign ontology to “worlds” in
this or other form and remove the wave function from
being ontological. Bostro¨m defines [124]:
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A world is a collection of finitely many
particles having a definite mass and a definite
position. ...
A metaworld is a temporally evolving su-
perposition of worlds of the same kind. ...
Any closed physical system is a meta-
world.
... there is actually a continuum of worlds
contained in the metaworld. This continuum
shall now be described by a time-dependent
universal wavefunction Ψt in such a way that
the measure
µt(Q) :=
∫
Q
dq|Ψt(q)|2 (16)
yields the amount or volume of worlds whose
configuration is contained within the set Q...
... the wavefunction is interpreted as de-
scribing a physically existing field, and its ab-
solute square is taken to represent the density
of this field, hence a density of worlds.
(Bostro¨m, 2012).
I will analyze below the possibility to view the wave func-
tion as a density of worlds.
Hall et al. [125] describe the ontology of “many in-
teracting worlds” (MIW). They name them “classical
worlds”. These worlds become identical to Bohmian
worlds in the limit of the continuum of worlds. In their
approach, there is no ontological wave function. It is a
derivable concept from the evolution of worlds (through
the “reverse engineering” of Bohmian theory). If there
are a finite number of worlds, we do not reconstruct the
exact wave function and the prescription is to use the
wavefunction obtained by a certain averaging procedure
based on the existing worlds.
The concept of interacting worlds seems to me a very
artificial way to introduce interaction in physics. The
theory has particles with well-defined trajectories. It
is natural to introduce interaction between particles.
The world can be viewed as a point in a configuration
space, but known physical interactions happen in a three-
dimensional space.
Sebens [126] names his paper “Quantum Mechanics
as Classical Physics”. Multiple Bohmian worlds picture
he names as “Prodigal Quantum Mechanics” but he ad-
vocates “Newtonian Quantum Mechanics” which is the
Prodigal Quantum Mechanics without the wave function.
He writes that in Newtonian quantum mechanics the in-
teraction is between particles, and he writes an equation
(it appears as Eq.3.7) which looks like the Second Law
of Newton:
mj
−→a j = −~∇j
[∑
k
−~2
2mk
(∇2√ρ√
ρ
)
+ V
]
. (17)
This equation, however, includes the world density ρ
which makes it a very complicated dependence, more
FIG. 7: A wave packet passing through a beam splitter, in
the Many Bohmian Worlds picture. In this example, there is
a chance of 70% to cross the beam splitter. The gray areas
represent the incident, transmitted and reflected wave func-
tions. Blue trajectories represent particles which get through
the beam splitter, while red trajectories represent reflected
particles.
complicated than calculating −→a j from the wave function.
Note that Sebens is trying to avoid attributing ontolog-
ical meaning not only to the wave function, but also to
the Bohmian (or classical) world itself. He prefers the
ontology of “worlds density” and particle velocity fields.
The postulate that our experience supervenes on
Bohmian particles allows simple explanation of our expe-
rience of probability. We assign probability to an event
in proportion to the number of Bohmian worlds in which
this event takes place. The concept of the density of
worlds provides a very good explanation. Consider, for
example, a particle passing through a beam splitter which
reflects 30% of the beam, Fig. 8. The equation for the
Bohmian particle velocity ensures that homogeneous dis-
tributions of a finite number of Bohmian worlds trans-
forms into two homogeneous distributions of outgoing
beams with corresponding densities.
This simple picture, however, is not applicable if there
is a continuum (or even an infinite but countable number)
of worlds. In this case we cannot define the concept of
worlds density, see Sec. 8 of [126]. If in any region of
the configuration space there is an infinity of worlds, we
cannot say that it is smaller or larger than in another
region.
This difficulty appears in the Bostro¨m, Hall et al., and
Sebens proposals. Assigning varying measure of existence
for different worlds (see Section XIII) resolves this prob-
lem, but I doubt that the authors will be ready to accept
my proposal. It seems that the quotation of Tipler: “the
square of the wave function measures, not a probability
density, but a density of Universes in the multiverse” is
crucial in all these approaches. Without admitting this,
Bostro¨m apparently adopts the concept of the measure
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of existence. His proposal for “volume of worlds” (16)
includes also the “weight” of each world |Ψt(q)|2. But
then, I do not see how it can be considered as a density
of worlds. As far as I can understand, for an infinite num-
ber of worlds there is no mathematical formalism which
can provide a “density of worlds” picture.
I recognise the same difficulty in the influential pro-
posal of Albert and Loewer [127] for dealing with prob-
ability in the MWI by introducing infinity of “minds”.
They write:
our proposal is to associate ... an infinite set
of minds in the corresponding mental state
MK ... P is a measure of the “proportion” of
minds in state MK .
(Albert and Loewer, 1988)
There is no mathematical formalism which provides such
a measure. Albert and Loewer wanted an infinity of
“minds” because they wanted to ensure that for every
quantum measurement, even when it will be performed in
the remote future, there always be minds for all possible
outcomes. Contrary to Bohmian worlds, the minds ran-
domly move from the state “ready” before the measure-
ment to the states corresponding to various outcomes.
Replacing infinity of minds by a very large, but finite,
number of minds resolves the problem, but for the price
of giving up the elegance and universal validity of the
theory.
XI. THE MWI
The MWI was proposed by Everett more than half
century ago [128]. For a long time it considered as a
bizarre proposal, almost a science fiction. The MWI got
some support from cosmologists, [129, 130]. In quantum
cosmology the MWI allows for discussion of the whole
Universe, thereby avoiding the difficulty of the standard
interpretation which requires an external observer. Later
it was supported by the community of quantum informa-
tion. It is easier to think about quantum algorithms as
parallel computations performed in parallel worlds [131].
In recent years the MWI receives an increasing atten-
tion both in physics and philosophy journals. I want to
believe that soon it will be established as the leading in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics [2].
As I described above, the attempts to eliminate the on-
tology of the wave function are not really successful. We
do not get a simpler ontology. Adding ontological enti-
ties beyond the wave function evolving according to the
Schro¨dinger equation, like Bohmian positions or GRW
hits modifying Schro¨dinger evolution are definitely useful
for providing a simper connection to our experience, but
they make quantum mechanics as a physical theory less
attractive: the theory becomes more complicated. More-
over, the additions make dramatic conceptual changes
of the theory: one adds a genuine randomness, another
introduces an action at distance. So, from the point of
view of a physicist, there is a tremendous advantage in
avoiding additions or changes of pure quantum mechan-
ics. The interpretational part of the theory then is much
more challenging. The picture of the world we experience
is not easily seen in the ontology of quantum theory. In
my view, the interpretational part does have a satisfac-
tory solution and the advantages of physics theory are by
far larger than the resulting difficulties in the interpreta-
tion.
The ontology of quantum theory is the wave function of
the Universe Ψ(t). Nothing else. There is also the Hamil-
tonian of the Univerese which determines the evolution
of Ψ, but this is a physical law, a parallel to the laws of
interaction in Newtonian physics the ontology of which
is positions of all particles ~ri(t) and values of classical
fields ~Aj(~r, t). Here ~Aj are all classical fields: electric,
magnetic, gravitational, etc.
Observables, and their values, which frequently consid-
ered as the basis of quantum theory, are not part of the
ontology. Consequently, Heisenberg Uncertainty Rela-
tions, Robertson Uncertainty Relations, Kochen-Specker
theorem, the EPR argument, the GHZ setup, and the
Bell inequalities are all irrelevant for analyzing funda-
mental properties of Nature. They have no bearing on
determinism, locality etc. I do not propose to exclude
observables from quantum theory. These are useful con-
cepts which are properties of the wave function that help
to connect the wave function with our experience. The
Bohmian positions do not appear in this approach to
quantum theory in any status.
In classical physics there is no difficulty to add ob-
servables and their values to the ontology of the theory.
The basic ontology, ~ri(t) and ~Aj(~r, t), uniquely specifies
the values of all observables. This, however, also tells us
that adding observables to the ontology is not needed.
Moreover, the connection to our experience is transpar-
ent even if only positions of particles ~ri(t) are considered
(cf Bohmian particle positions). Positions of atoms of a
cat as a function of time provide a very good picture of
a cat.
In the framework of the MWI it is not easy to see the
connection between the wave function of atoms of a cat
and our experience of a cat. The main difficulty is that
the wave function of the Universe describes the cat in
many different states and, moreover, the electrons of the
cat might be in very different objects in parallel worlds.
But it is frequently claimed that even in a hypothetical
single-world Universe [132] with a cat in one state, Ψ
cannot explain our experience [103]. This is a criticism
not just of the MWI, it applies also to the von Neumann
Collapse and to the GRW-type collapse theories with-
out flashes or matter density additions to ontology. The
wave function Ψ is defined in a high-dimensional configu-
ration space, while our experience understood in a three-
dimensional (3D) space. Formally, N classical particles
are also described by a point in the configuration space,
but they can also be viewed as N particles in 3D space.
The wave function of N quantum particles in the config-
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uration space in general cannot be considered as N wave
functions in 3D space. If some particles are entangled
we have to view the wave function in the configuration
space: Ψ(r1, r2) 6= ψ(r1)ψ(r2).
Yes, we do not “experience” entanglement. We cannot
“experience” entanglement. “We” are local. Experience
is a causal chain in our brain. Interactions in physics
are local, so it is a chain of local and locally connected
events. Surely, there is an entanglement between parti-
cles in my body. The electrons and nuclei of each atom
are entangled. Atoms in every molecule are entangled.
But, at the end, there is no entanglement in our expe-
rience. We do not “feel” the state of every electron of
our body. Our experience supervenes on the state of our
neurons, and, in particular, on the well localized states
of our neurons. Center of mass variable of neurons are
not in entangled states when we have a particular expe-
rience. In a single world of the MWI, or in the GRW
world, the quantum wave packets of neurons on which
our experience supervenes are well localized in the 3D
space. So, we can, in principle, (we do not have yet a
developed theory of our experience) view the wave func-
tion of the world as product of wave functions of relevant
variables in the 3D space, multiplied by the entangled
wave functions of atoms, molecules etc. responsible for
the stability of matter.
We also will write an entangled state for the wave func-
tions of qubits in a quantum computer if we have one
[131]. The way to understand its operation is to view it
as a set of parallel computations. Since the requirement
for operation of a quantum computer is a suppression of
decoherence, the computations need not be considered in
the 3D space.
In the MWI we introduce a concept of a “world”. It
is not an ontology: in fact, it is defined by our expe-
rience, it is a sensible story (causally connected events)
that we experience. It does correspond to a set of quan-
tum states of the Universe corresponding to that experi-
ence. Although there is a large freedom in defining what
we might name as a world, I would not consider any or-
thogonal set of quantum states as a decomposition to
worlds. My preferred definition is that in a world, by
definition, all macroscopic objects are well localized [2].
This is still a vague description since “macroscopic” and
“well localized” are not precisely defined, but, since this
concept is not about ontology of the theory, it needs not
be defined with the same rigour as required in a theory
about physical entities.
The locality and strength of the interactions in Na-
ture ensure stability of worlds until we encounter a situ-
ation corresponding to a quantum measurement in which
a world splits into a superposition of states each corre-
sponding to different macroscopic descriptions. When
it happens, the MWI tells that that the world splits
into several worlds. This is when von Neumann pos-
tulates that collapse makes all but one part of the su-
perposition to disappear. Usually, this is also when the
GRW mechanism leads to the collapse of the wave func-
tion. Note, however, that in the Stern-Gerlach experi-
ment with a screen [87], the splitting to stable branches
happens shortly after the atom hits the screen, while the
GRW collapse mechanism might need much longer time
to eliminate all but one branches.
The wave function corresponding to a world is the wave
function of all particles with a property that all macro-
scopic objects are well localized. If we take this wave
function and draw the centers of wave packets of all par-
ticles, we will obtain a picture which is very similar to
the Bohmian world in which the Bohmian particle po-
sitions are somewhere inside the particle wave packets.
The Bohmian world is accepted as a good description of
the world, it is also very similar to the Newtonian parti-
cles world. This provides the correspondence of the wave
function of a world and our experience.
The procedure which provides the correspondence be-
tween the wave function of a world and our experience is
an additional physical postulate of the theory. It is not
about what is in the physical Universe. The ontology
is solely the wave function of the Universe. It is about
us, who are we in this ontology, what corresponds to
our senses. This is a counterpart of the postulate in the
Bohmian theory according to which our senses supervene
on Bohmian positions.
The decomposition of the wave function of the Universe
into wave functions of worlds, the approximate unique-
ness of the decomposition (it changes according to how
fine grained we want to define our worlds) and its sta-
bility between the measurements follow from the mul-
titude and the high density of particles around us and
the strength of electromagnetic interactions (which are
responsible for most of phenomena we observe). The ex-
tensive decoherence research program, see e.g. [133–136]
made this statement uncontroversial. This is in contrast
with the early days of the MWI when the “preferred ba-
sis” issue considered to be a central problem of the MWI.
The second main problem of the MWI, the issue of proba-
bility, which is the topic of the next two sections, remains
controversial until today.
XII. THE ILLUSION OF PROBABILITY IN
THE MWI
There are two problems of probability in the MWI, one
is qualitative and another is quantitative. First, it seems
that the theory does not allow to define the concept of
probability, the “incoherence” problem in the terminol-
ogy of Wallace [137]. Second, it is frequently claimed,
and not less frequently denied, that the MWI allows a
derivation of the Born rule. This section is devoted to
the first problem.
Consider the Stern-Gerlach experiment, Fig. 3a when
we measure the z component of spin prepared in a su-
perposition of “up” and “down”. We may ask: What
is the probability to get the outcome “up”? The stan-
dard meaning is that only one of the two options might
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be realized: either “up” or “down”. But the MWI tells
that in the future there will be both. We may try to ask
instead: What is the probability that “I” will see “up”?
The MWI tells that in the future there will be “I” that
see “up” and another “I” that see “down”. In the MWI
I advocate, it is meaningless to ask which “I” shall “I”,
making the experiment, be. There is nothing in the the-
ory which connects “I” before the experiment to just one
of the future “I”s.
If we are in the framework of the Many Bohmian
Worlds interpretation, the problem does not arise. I, by
definition, live in a world with particular Bohmian po-
sitions of all particles, and, in particular, of the particle
which is measured in the stern-Gerlach experiment. The
outcome is fixed before the measurement. I, however,
by definition, cannot know it in advance, so we have a
well-defined notion of ignorance probability.
The Albert-Loewer many minds picture [127] is also
not problematic. According to their construction there
will be a matter of fact what outcome will see every par-
ticular mind. Since they suggest a random evolution of
minds, we have genuinely random event here and a per-
fectly legitimate concept of probability. The objective
chance probability.
The pure MWI picture I advocate here does have a
problem. There is no randomness and also there is no
ignorance: all relevant information prior to the measure-
ment is known to the observer. The question about prob-
ability of a particular outcome is illegitimate. There is
no genuine concept of probability in the MWI!
But let us consider now the von Neumann collapse the-
ory. The ontology now is a single wave function of a
world, not a superposition of wave functions of worlds.
The experience postulate remains the same: our experi-
ence supervenes on the wave function of the world. The
wave function of the world in the single world Universe
and the wave function of the world in the many-world
Universe which has the same macroscopic description, are
identical. Therefore, the experiences in the two worlds
are also identical. In the single-world Universe with the
von Neumann collapses, the concept of probability is fine:
every time there is only one outcome of a quantum ex-
periment generated by a genuinely random process.
In both theories the experiences of individual observers
are the same. If the experiences are the same, they should
have the same reasons to believe in one or other theory.
So, it might happen that the von Neumann theory is
correct, but the observer tends to believe in the MWI, or
vice versa. In one theory there is a genuine probability,
in another there is no probability, but the experiences are
the same.
The paradox follows from the fact that we are not used
to situations with multiple worlds which split. Assume
that a new technology will have a machine which puts
a person in and gets two identical persons out with the
same memory, shape etc. You know that while you are
asleep, you will be taken to this machine and the one of
“you” will be returned home, while another “you” moved
to another city. Moreover, you will be told all the details
about the experiment, everything. It can be imagined
that the complete wave function of the Universe will be
given to you. In the morning, both of you, before you
open your eyes, are asked: “What is your probability to
be at home?” This is a meaningless question for everyone
except for the two of you. There is a well-defined answer
to this question which you, who know everything about
the Universe, do not know. The question is about your
identity. In which world are you? Before the experiment
it was a meaningless question: you will split in two. One
of “you” will be at home and one of “you” will be in an-
other city. After the splitting, the question has a perfect
sense, and if you have not opened your eyes yet, it is not
a trivial question for which the probability is 0 or 1. Be-
fore opening your eyes, the two of you will have exactly
the same memory state, so they should assign exactly
the same probability. Both of “you” are related to you
before the experiment, so we can formally associate the
legitimate concept of probability of two of “you” in the
morning with your illusion of probability in the evening
before. It is an illusion because for having a genuine con-
cept of probability it is required to have only one option
to be realized. In this example (as in the MWI) there is
nothing which can single out just one option.
Probability is a subtle philosophical issue. It is ac-
cepted that the de Finetti approach to it as a readiness
to put an intelligent bet is as good definition as any.
When you put a bet, the reward is obtained by you in
the future. Since two of you in the morning have a le-
gitimate concept of probability, they would like “you” in
the evening to make the bet for them. This provides the
meaning of (illusion of) probability for an observer before
quantum experiment in the framework of the MWI: the
ignorance probability of his descendants [138]. And we
do not need a sophisticated technology. Ask your friends
to move you while you asleep after using the iPhone “Uni-
verse Splitter” application ($1.99) or the Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity World Splitter [139] (free). Given a laboratory
with a single photon detector, you can split the world
yourself. Even watching an old blinking fluorescent bulb
will do, because the irregular blinking is a clearly under-
stood quantum effect.
The resolution of the “incoherence” problem which I
propose is still controversial. Albert [140] claims that the
probability meaning appears too late, he thinks that it
is crucial to have a legitimate probability concept before
performing the quantum experiment. In spite of the diffi-
culties of attaching the trans-temporal identity to worlds,
Saunders and Wallace [141] are trying to defend the di-
verging instead of splitting worlds picture. Tappenden
[142], however, apparently supports my position.
The ignorance meaning of probability is a subjective
concept of an observer in a particular world. It is not the
probability of an outcome of a quantum experiment (all
outcomes take place) but the probability of self-location
of the observer after the measurement, probability that
he is in the world with this outcome. Let us turn, in the
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next section, to the quantitative probability problem.
XIII. THE MEASURE OF EXISTENCE OF
EVERETT WORLDS
Starting from Everett himself, and recently led by
Deutsch and Wallace [143, 144], there are attempts to
prove that the counterpart of the Born rule can be de-
rived just from the formalism of the MWI. The contro-
versy about this subject follows, in my view, from differ-
ent understandings of what is exactly assumed.
It is hard for me to take a strong side in the controversy
because, on the one hand, I do see strong arguments for
the Born rule, but on the other hand, I do not see a
particular advantage of the MWI on this issue relative
to, say, the von Neumann Collapse theory with the von
Neumann cut somewhere in the measurement process.
What should be considered as “the formalism of the
MWI” in this context? Clearly, the part of it is the
statement: the ontology of our Universe is the wave func-
tion evolving according to the Schro¨dinger equation. We
need also the postulate that our experience(s) supervene
on the wave function only. One might say that there is
no need to postulate this: we already postulated that
there is nothing but the wave function, so our experience
has nothing, but the wave function to supervene on. I
feel that we do need to add some postulate. We need to
add that our experience supervenes on the wave function
in the way sketched above: we experience a cat because
the wave function is roughly the product of the localized
wave packets of atoms which all together have the shape
of a cat. There is a logical possibility that our experience
supervenes on the wave function in some other, maybe a
very different way, say, through a shade the “cat” leaves
on the wall in the Plato’s cave.
As explained in the previous section, there is no real
probability in the MWI, there is only an illusion of prob-
ability. So we have to derive what Tappenden named
the Born-Vaidman rule [138, 142], the rule according to
which an observer should bet for his descendants, i.e. for
his copies at the time after the measurement. Let me
sketch now what can be viewed as a derivation of the
Born-Vaidman rule (for more details see [132]).
Consider a quantum experiment in which the parti-
cle wave function splits in a completely symmetrical way
into three spatially separated, completely identical wave
packets described by the quantum state:
ψ =
1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉), (18)
where |A〉, |B〉 and |C〉 are the wave packets in locations
A, B, and C. From the symmetry of the problem it
follows that the probability to find the particle in A is
p = 13 . In [132] I do it in more details ensuring that
also the observer will be in three identical states. This
will create three identical worlds (up to the symmetry
transformations A → B → C → A) so the probability
of an observer to finds himself in any of them, and in
particular in the A-world, is one third.
Anything which happens in a space-like separate loca-
tion cannot change the probability of the outcome of an
experiment in A, since such a change of the probability
allows sending superluminal signals in direct contradic-
tion with the special theory of relativity. We can distort
the wave packets |B〉 and |C〉 by adding a phase or by
changing their shape, Fig. 7a:
|ψ〉 → |ψ1〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ eiθ|B〉+ |C ′〉). (19)
We can split the wave packets |B〉 and |C〉, Fig. 7b:
|ψ〉 → |ψ2〉 = 1√
3
|A〉 + 1√
6
(|B1〉+ |B2〉)
+
1
3
(|C1〉+ |C2〉+ |C3〉). (20)
We can make one wave packet out of the wave packets in
|B〉 and |C〉 through the interference on a beam splitter,
Fig. 7c:
|ψ〉 → |ψ3〉 = 1√
3
|A〉+
√
2
3
|D〉. (21)
Moreover, the probability of finding the particle in A
should not be changed if we distort the local state |A〉 →
|A′〉, otherwise it will influence the probability of detec-
tion in spatially separated location D. All this tells us
that the probability to find the particle in A depends
solely on the absolute value of the amplitude in A. This
is the amplitude of the wave function of the “A-world”,
the world in which the particle was found in A.
I define the square of the absolute value of the ampli-
tude of the wave function corresponding to a particular
world as the measure of existence of this world. It cannot
be changed unless we split the world into more worlds
such that the total measure of the worlds remains the
same. When in a quantum measurement a world splits
into several worlds, the observer should bet on different
outcomes of the measurement in proportion to the mea-
sures of existence of corresponding worlds.
This is the Born-Vaidman rule. The rational for such
betting can be as explained above: the observer does it
for his future selves that do have the probability concept
of self-location. The justification for betting in propor-
tion to the measure of existence is symmetry if all the
worlds have equal measures of existence. If the measures
are not equal, the observer can consider a procedure in
which in every world quantum measurements of some ir-
relevant properties are performed which split the worlds
into more worlds, such that at the end of the procedure
all the worlds have equal (up to a desired precision) mea-
sures of existence. Now, a natural approach of counting
worlds with a particular outcome yields the desired result
[143].
The argument for the Born-Vaidman rule in the frame-
work of the MWI can be transformed into the argument
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FIG. 8: Probability of finding particle in A equal one third due to symmetry. Modifications of states in B and C cannot change
the probability in A since there is no action at a distance in quantum theory. a) The wave packet in B gets local phase and
the one in C is distorted in space. b) The wave packet in B splits into two identical wave packets and the one in C splits into
three. c) Using a beam splitter the wave packets in B and C interfere into one wave packet |D〉.
for the Born rule in the framework of the von Neu-
mann Collapse approach. Until we make a measurement
of where the particle is, the disturbances of the wave
function are described identically in the two approaches.
When we do make measurements, e.g. in the procedure
of splitting worlds to the equal-size worlds, I find argu-
ing in the framework of the MWI easier. In the collapse
approach we should talk about possibilities, but the sym-
metry argument can be applied there too.
The advantage of the MWI approach can be seen in an
elegant resolution of the controversy in classical probabil-
ity, the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Beauty goes to sleep
on Sunday. She knows that a fair coin will be tossed
while she is asleep. If the coin lands Tails, then she
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will be awakened once on Monday and once on Tuesday,
without having on Tuesday any memory of the previ-
ous awakening. If the coin lands Heads, then Beauty
is awakened on Monday only. Upon each awakening,
she is asked for her credence in the proposition: “The
coin has landed Heads”. Elga [145] argued that her cre-
dence should be 1/3, while David Lewis [146] argued for
1/2. Since then, philosophers have been divided between
halfers and thirders.
Replacing the classical coin by a quantum coin, and
analyzing the problem using the concept of the measure
of existence of worlds, the credence of one third is ob-
tained in a simple and transparent way [147]. With an
obvious notation, the wave function on Monday is
|Ψ〉Mon = 1√
2
(|H, awake〉Mon + |T, awake〉Mon). (22)
and the wavefunction on Tuesday is
|Ψ〉Tue = 1√
2
(|H, awake〉Tue + |T, sleep〉Tue). (23)
Upon awakening, Beauty knows that she experiences one
of three possible events: either it is Monday and the coin
landed Heads (HMon), or Monday and Tails (TMon), or
Tuesday and Tails (TTue). The measures of existence of
the corresponding branches are equal, µ(T ) = ( 1√
2
)2 = 12 .
Since only one of the events corresponds to Heads, her
credence in Heads should be
Cr(H) =
µ(HMon)
µ(HMon) + µ(TMon) + µ(TTue)
=
1
3
. (24)
Note that Peter Lewis [148] also addressed the Sleeping
Beauty problem in the MWI framework, but advocated
the halfer solution. The concept of the measure of exis-
tence allows a transparent analysis of his error, see [147].
In the discussion above I have shown a manifestation
of the measures of existence of future worlds which will
be created after the measurement. Is the measure of ex-
istence of the present world has a physical manifestation?
An observer does not feel the measure of existence of the
world she lives in. There is no experiment she can per-
form that distinguishes between large and small measures
of existence. Nevertheless, I do see a difference [138].
There is a hypothetical situation in which she should be-
have differently based on her knowledge of the measure
of existence of her present world. She might know the
relative measure of existence of her world and a parallel
world if she performed a quantum experiment a minute
ago. The hypothetical situation which manifests the dif-
ference includes an alien with a super technology which
convinces the observer that he can make interference ex-
periments with macroscopic objects. The alien offers a
bet to the observer about the outcome of another exper-
iment that she will perform in her laboratory. Now, the
measure of existence of the present world matters. The
observer suspects that the alien will use a parallel world
to interfere and change the odds of her quantum experi-
ment. If the measure of existence of her world is smaller
than that of the parallel world, then she should refuse to
make any bet since alien can arrange any outcome with
certainty. If however, her world has larger measure of
existence than the parallel world, the alien can change
the probability only up to some limit, so she can place
some bets.
We can be in the role of the alien for a photon in a
laboratory. A photon reaching a second 50%/50% beam
splitter in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer “thinks” that
it can pass the beam splitter and reach a detector behind
it with probability half. We, however can tune the inter-
ferometer in such a way that it will be a dark port, so
the photon has zero chance to reach the detector.
The name “measure of existence” suggests ontology,
but “worlds” are not part of the ontology of the MWI
that I advocate. “I”, people are also not part of the
ontology. We are patterns, shapes of the wave function.
I and my world certainly exist and are “real”, but not in
the sense of the reality of the wave function. It might be
useful to introduce some new semantics, something like
“physical reality” and “reality of experience”, “physical
ontology” and “experience ontology”. Note that the term
“primitive ontology” has already been introduced [149].
It is not the wave function of the Universe (as it lives in
the 3D space) and it is not defined by experience. Too
many concepts of ontology might lead to a confusion.
XIV. (NON)LOCALITY
When we consider the physical Universe and do not
think about us in this Universe, we have a theory which
describes it in a deterministic and, in some sense, local
way. The wave function of the Universe Ψ at one time
determines completely Ψ at all times. Without collapse
in quantum measurement the EPR-Bell-GHZ nonlocality
is not present in quantum theory: local actions change
nothing in remote locations.
Interactions are local in 3D space, so a simple and
coherent picture would be waves of all particles locally
interacting with each other. The wave function of the
Universe is not like this due to entanglement, but it can
be decomposed into a superposition of products of wave
functions of all particles. Decomposition into a super-
position of products of wave functions of molecules or
slightly bigger objects corresponds to the decomposition
into the superposition of wave functions of worlds of the
MWI.
In classical theory, there is a simple local picture of
interactions. Particles create fields in a local way. These
fields, or change in these fields spread out in space not
faster than light. Then particles feel local forces due to
these fields and change their velocities. In quantum the-
ory, the interactions also local, but this Newtonian pic-
ture does not exist. There is (a complicate) counterpart
of the Second Law of Newton for Bohmian particles (17),
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but not for the wave function.
The Schro¨dinger and other equations for the evolu-
tion of the wave function are based on potentials, not
on local fields. This picture is not explicitly local since
potentials do not have definite local values: they can
be changed through gauge transformations without any
physical change. Only some global properties of poten-
tials (such as integrals on closed curves) are gauge invari-
ant. One of such integrals, the line integral of the vector
potential of the electromagnetic field, plays a central role
in the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect [150]. It can be ob-
served using an interference experiment with a charged
particle even if the particle never passes through a region
with an electromagnetic field.
The AB effect convinced the physics community that
in quantum theory (in contrast to classical theory) poten-
tials are not just auxiliary constructions for calculating
fields, but have direct physical effects. It means that
a simple classical picture with particles creating fields
which locally affect motion of other particle cannot be
true in quantum theory. Quantum theory cannot be lo-
cal in the form of locality of classical physics. (The “Sec-
ond Law of Newton” for Bohmian particles (17) can be
considered local, but the Bohmian theory is manifestly
nonlocal due to the possibility of remote change of ρ.)
My hope is that the MWI removes the nonlocality from
quantum theory. By denying the existence of the collapse
of the wave function, the MWI removes the action at a
distance due to quantum measurements, but the absence
of collapse does not help removing nonlocality of the AB
effect. Although the AB effect does not provide an action
at a distance, it apparently does not allow a local expla-
nation of the evolution of the quantum wave function.
Recently, however, I proposed a local explanation of
the AB effect [151]. In the standard approach to the AB
effect, the electromagnetic field and its source are classi-
cal. But classical physics was shown to be incorrect ex-
perimentally, so for the precise analysis everything should
be considered quantum. Building a model of a solenoid
in the AB setup as two oppositely charged cylinders ro-
tating in opposite directions I could consider the source
of the magnetic field in the framework of the quantum
theory. I have shown that the field of the electron passing
through two sides of the solenoid causes, due to the local
forces on the cylinders, small rotations in opposite direc-
tions. Considering the cylinders as quantum objects, the
tiny relative rotation transforms into the relative phase
in the wave functions of the cylinders. In the beginning of
the AB experiment, the electron becomes entangled with
the cylinders. In the end of the process, the electron and
the cylinders are again in the product state, but the rel-
ative phase acquired by the cylinders is transformed to
the electron which exhibits the AB effect. I have shown
that the relative phase in the cylinders is exactly equal
to the AB phase, thus providing a local explanation of
the AB effect.
This result leaves me a hope that one day there will be
a local version of quantum mechanics, the counterpart of
Newton’s Laws formulation of classical physics. Even for
classical physics, global approaches starting with Hamil-
tonian or Lagrangian are more efficient and can explain
everything. And I do not foresee that in quantum theory
there will be some effects not explainable in a global way.
But, that does not necessarily mean that there might not
be an alternative, equally valuable, local description.
The existence (or the nonexistence) of the local field
picture is a very important feature of Nature. It has
testable consequences even before such picture is discov-
ered. If such theory exists, it follows that when all parti-
cles move in field free regions, no effect of these fields and
its potentials can be observed. A particular version of the
Electric AB effect corresponds to such situation [151]. In
this setup there are potentials but the electromagnetic
fields vanish at locations of every particle. Careful calcu-
lations [152] based on electromagnetic potentials which
take all systems into account show that, indeed, in this
setup the AB effect vanishes.
The physical Universe is local in the sense that there
is no action at a distance. In a particular gauge, local
changes of the wave function are explained by local val-
ues of potentials. There is also a hope that one might
find a gauge independent formalism with local actions.
But there are connections between different parts of the
Universe, the wave function of the Universe is entangled.
Entanglement is the essence of the nonlocality of the Uni-
verse. “Worlds” correspond to sets of well localized ob-
jects all over in space, so, in this sense, worlds are non-
local entities. Quantum measurements performed on en-
tangled particles lead to splitting of worlds with different
local descriptions. Frequently such measurements lead to
quantum paradoxes which will be discussed in the next
section.
XV. RESOLUTION OF QUANTUM
PARADOXES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
MWI
Paradoxical nonlocal phenomena in a single-world pic-
ture obtain local explanation in the framework of the
MWI. The nonlocality of the GHZ and other EPR-Bell
type situations follows from the nonlocality of “worlds”.
By definition, macroscopic objects are well localized in
each world, but at least some of the objects are local-
ized in a different way in various worlds. Spatially sepa-
rated entangled particles, through local interaction with
macroscopic objects, create worlds with nonlocal corre-
lations. Measurement of one particle of the EPR pair
changes nothing for the other particle if it is considered
in the Universe, but it creates worlds with definite spin
of a remote particle.
If the EPR pair is used for teleportation, the Bell mea-
surement in one site creates four worlds with the quan-
tum state teleported to the second particle of the pair
and rotated in four definite ways. The mixture of these
four states corresponds to a completely unpolarized den-
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sity matrix, the description of the particle of an undis-
turbed EPR pair. Thus again, from the point of view of
the Universe, no change in the second EPR particle took
place.
Another paradoxical example is an interaction-free
measurement (IFM) [153]. We can sometimes (and in
an improved setup [154] almost always) find an opaque
object, i.e. to know with certainty that it is present in
a particular place, without visiting this place. We get
information about the place without any particle passing
through, without a particle reflecting from it and even
without a particle being near this place. The operational
meaning that a particle was not in a particular place is
that it left no trace of any strength at this place.
The basic IFM is just a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
tuned to a complete destructive interference in one of
the output ports running with single photons. We test
that there is nothing everywhere inside the interferometer
except for a one place on the path of one of the arms of
the interferometer. If a single run provides a click in the
dark port, we know that in this place there is an object.
On the other hand, we are certain that the photon left
zero trace in the arm of the interferometer where the
object was present since a single photon cannot be found
in two places.
In the one world picture this is a very paradoxical sit-
uation: we cannot see where is the causal link between
the presence of an object and our knowledge about the
presence of the object. But physics describes all worlds
together. In a parallel world the particle was absorbed
by the object. It left a (weak) trace near the object.
Based on the IFM, similar paradoxical tasks have been
suggested and achieved. Counterfactual computation
[155], in which we obtain the result of the computation
without running the computer, has the same resolution in
the MWI framework: in parallel worlds the computer has
been running. Counterfactual cryptography [156, 157]
based on the fact that the particle carrying the informa-
tion was not present in the area where Eve could mea-
sure it. In parallel worlds the particle was near Eve, but
the cryptographic protocol was cleverly arranged such
that in these parallel worlds the transmitted key has been
aborted.
It has also been claimed that “direct counterfactual
communication” [158, 159], “counterfactual entangle-
ment distribution” [160], and “counterfactual transport-
ing of an unknown qubit” [161], are possible. In these
protocols, indeed, the particle which transmits the infor-
mation could not pass through the transmission channel.
However, I find that these protocols cannot be named
“counterfactual” [162]. The particle cannot pass through
the transmission channel, but it leaves a trace there. Re-
cent experiment with a similar setup demonstrates this
trace [163]. So, my conclusion is that we cannot say
that the particle was not there. (Note that the authors
of “direct counterfactual communication protocol” were
not convinced [164–166].)
I use the criterion that the particle was where it left a
FIG. 9: (a). The weak trace left by the photon entering the
interferometer in the world in which it was detected in dtector
D2. (b). The weak trace left by the photon in the physical
Universe.
weak trace, so the particle was in the transmission chan-
nel. The paradoxical feature of the particle’s trace is that
the trace is not continuous from the source to the detec-
tor. In the example conceptually similar to all these pro-
tocols, the trace appears inside an inner interferometer,
but there is no trace which leads towards (and outside)
the interferometer [167], see Fig. 9a. Again, this para-
doxical situation happens in a single world in which the
photon was detected by D2. In the physical Universe,
and in the three parallel worlds in which the photon en-
tered the interferometer and was detected by detectors
D1, D2, and D3 taken together, the trace which photon
leaves is not paradoxical, see Fig. 9b.
What I mean by “not paradoxical trace” is that it is
continuous, we do not have a separate island of trace as
in Fig. 9a. But there is still another paradoxical fea-
ture: one particle leaves simultaneously trace in a few
separate places. Although the trace is weak, there are
experiments which can identify the local trace with cer-
tainty (these experiments succeed only rarely). The weak
trace in Fig. 9b is entangled, so in a world in which strong
trace is discovered in one of the paths, the traces in other
locations disappear immediately. Considering a history
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of a world with such measurements, we see actions at a
distance due to these measurements. There is no action
at a distance only in the physical Universe, where all the
worlds are considered together.
XVI. CONLUSIONS
In this paper I reviewed the interpretations and the
fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics, arguing
that, contrary to a popular view, quantum theory can be
considered as a deterministic theory describing Nature.
The theory has two parts. The first part is physical,
mathematical, the one to which I attach the words “on-
tological” or “ontic” (without attributing a distinction
between them). It is a counterpart of the theory of par-
ticles and fields in classical physics. This is the part of a
theory about what is in the physical Universe. Although
I discussed several approaches, I find by far the best op-
tion to take the wave function of the Universe, and only
it, as the ontology of the theory. Major part of the paper
explains why I have this view. I also review numerous
recent works on the subject pointing in this direction.
The theory of the wave function is a deterministic the-
ory without action at a distance. It is the theory about
what is, irrespectively of us. Even quantum observables,
like momentum, energy, spin, etc. which are frequently
considered to be the starting point of quantum mechan-
ics, are not considered ontological in this approach. Thus,
various uncertainty relations between quantum variables
do not lead to indeterminism.
The second part of the theory makes the connection
to us and our experience. I do not use the words “onto-
logical” and “ontic” for that part: experiences, people,
chairs, and even our worlds are not ontological in this
view. Our experiences supervene on the wave function
of the Universe but in a non trivial way. Since observ-
ables are not ontological, connection between experience
and ontology requires elaborate construction. The main
reason for the difficulty is that the ontology, the wave
function of the Universe, corresponds to multiple experi-
ences. Thus, we need to define the concept of a “world”,
the concept of “I”, etc. All these are just properties,
shapes of the wave function, and in fact, the shape of
a particular term in the superposition which constitutes
the wave function of the Universe. Although the detailed
correspondence is difficult, the locality and strength of
physical interactions suggest that such a program is fea-
sible and for small systems for which it has been imple-
mented, it never led to contradictions.
I hope that this work will trigger further analysis: ex-
tending this picture to quantum field theory, tightening
the gaps in understanding of our senses, clarifying the
philosophical concepts. Science needs to reach a consen-
sus regarding interpretation of quantum mechanics and I
feel that physics tells us that this is the most promising
direction.
The theory of Universal wave function is determinis-
tic, local, free of paradoxes, and fully consistent with
our experience. I do not see “clouds” in the beauty and
clearness of quantum theory similar to “two clouds” Lord
Kelvin saw in 1900 in classical physics.
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